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ACCOUNTING FOR THE
STAMP ACT CRISIS
Abstract: In 1765, the British Parliament imposed stamp duties on the
American colonies, setting in motion the chain of events which ultimately led to the American Revolution. This paper analyzes the practicalities of the Stamp Act to provide insights into the way in which
a tax instrument that was successful in one setting failed to achieve
similar success in another. The reasons for choosing stamp duties as
an appropriate fiscal measure, the colonial reaction to the tax, and
the way in which the tax was accounted for by the British government
bureaucracy are examined. The paper demonstrates the value of using an accounting lens to provide a more nuanced interpretation of
the Stamp Act crisis.

INTRODUCTION
Taxation lies at the heart of the relationship between the
state and its subjects and is intertwined with accounting. Its design is informed by accounting and its implementation creates
new accountings for both the state and the subject. The purpose
of this paper is to examine a particular incarnation of taxation
– the imperial stamp duty imposed by the British Parliament
on the American colonies briefly from 1765 to 1766, the demise
of which is referred to as the “Stamp Act crisis.” The version of
stamp duty imposed on the colonies bore strong resemblance
to that in operation in Great Britain with some modifications
to accommodate colonial conditions. By the middle of the 18th
century, a stamp duty had become an accepted part of the tax
landscape in Britain, and the administrative machinery by
which it was collected was firmly established. In view of this, the
vehement rejection of a similar impost by the colonists was not
a response that was either anticipated or expected. The response
by the colonists can, we argue, be partly attributed to inadequate
design. The British government failed to consider fully the logistical difficulties that would arise in putting the stamp duty in
place in a remote location.
Published by eGrove, 2008
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As a precursor to the American Revolution, the Stamp Act
crisis is an important object of study. Indeed, much has been
written about it in terms of its broader political implications
[Morgan and Morgan, 1953; Gipson, 1954; Morgan, 1973; Thomas, 1975; Bullion, 1982] and from the perspective of contemporary ideology [Bailyn, 1967]. We have, however, identified a gap
in the literature as little has been written about the Stamp Act
crisis from the viewpoint of its logistics. The questions of how it
was to be administered, what problems were associated with its
implementation, and how the proceeds were accounted for have
rarely been addressed. In this paper, we consider the practicalities of the Stamp Act, its initial design, and the mechanics of its
operation, so as to provide insight into a neglected aspect of the
crisis and the method of accounting. This paper also makes a
contribution to the literature relating to 18th century taxation in
a colonial setting, another topic on which little has been written.
The focus of our examination is a set of accounts discussed
below. These were drawn up in 1772, and provide clear evidence in an accounting context of the failure of the stamp duty
to operate as planned. We consider these, together with other
primary source documents, and formulate an additional ex
planation for the failure of the imperial Stamp Act. The episode
highlights the difficulties in achieving action at a distance in a
pre-modern setting. The set of audited accounts, contained in
the National Archives, followed the return of unused stamped
paper to Britain and relate specifically to the “American Stamp
Duties” [N.A.: AO3/10861]. The main account, shown in Figure
1, is supported by a number of subsidiary accounts. In order to
explain the way in which the final version of the Stamp Act was
administered, we draw on these accounts, which raise a number
of questions about the logistics of implementing the stamp duty.
Although referred to in passing by a number of commentators,
we have been unable to uncover any systematic attempt to
unravel and explicate the 1772 American Stamp Act accounts,
other than a description of its contents in Koeppel [1976]. The
accounts provide a fascinating glimpse into the convoluted way
in which the process of handling the stamped paper was managed between the various actors responsible for putting the
Stamp Act into operation. Unfortunately, we have been unable
to locate the underlying working papers and, as a result, some
1
An explanation of the references from the U.K. National Archives (N.A.) and
the British Library (BM) can be found at the end of the paper for those unfamiliar
with them.
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of the entries depicted in the accounts cannot be verified or even
explained.
A cursory examination raises some interesting issues to
which this paper will refer; for example, the role of the warehouse keepers, one of unstamped goods and one of stamped
goods. In addition, there is the matter of only £4,000 recorded
as received for a tax that was predicted to produce significantly
more revenue, the cancellation of stamped paper to the value of
approximately £155,000, and the outstanding balances due from
the stamp distributors in the colonies. All of these are evidence
of the signal failure of the Stamp Act in America.
EXCURSUS: HISTORIOGRAPHY OF
THE STAMP ACT CRISIS
Lamb [2003] stresses the importance of engagement with
wider scholarship, not only within the accounting history field,
but also beyond to areas in which general historical literature
deals with issues of concern to the accounting historian. There
is a rich and established literature around the Stamp Act crisis,
and, at this point, it is apposite to clarify our contribution. Some
of the documents to which we refer have not been prominent in
the literature, in particular the accounts which we reproduce in
this paper. The American historiography of the Stamp Act crisis
remains dominated by the work of the Morgans, specifically
The Stamp Act Crisis: Prologue to Revolution. Breen [1997, p.
14] notes that in 1957, Morgan “effectively shifted the focus of
research from the metropolitan centre to the colonial periphery.” Consequently, as British historians busied themselves with
remapping 18th century British politics and culture, American
historians tended to ignore “the English side of the story.”
In the opinion of Hecht [1976], few aspects of the American
Revolution have been more thoroughly studied. She divides into
three streams the “vantage points” from which the Stamp Act
crisis is viewed. The first considers the Stamp Act crisis as an
essentially American phenomenon. Indeed, this is the approach
taken by the Morgans and by Bailyn [1967], who examined the
ideological arguments based on careful analysis of pamphlets
and other literature. The second is a wider approach that considers the colonial events in the light of a broader imperial
context as adopted in Gipson’s work [1954]. Finally, a number of
historians approach the topic from a purely British perspective
[e.g., Ritcheson, 1954]. Thomas [1975] conducts a microanalysis
of British politics of the period. Langford [1976, p. 394], in a rePublished by eGrove, 2008
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view of Thomas, proclaimed it the definitive account, and went
so far as to say that “the story of the stamp act crisis will certainly not need telling again.” Breen [1997, p. 15] comments that, by
the 1980s, there was evidence of an “interpretive shift” in studies
of 18th century England, with revisionist accounts shifting the
focus from “elite political life” to, for example, “the development
and maturation of an impressive fiscal military state.”
Bullion [1982], again from the third of Hecht’s vantage
points, focused on George Grenville. Langford [1985, pp. 897898] reviewing this work in 1985, suggested that while Bullion
offered more detail than his predecessors, “on most important
questions...major conclusions have been reached and the permissible area of debate long since reduced to a minimum attainable on the evidence available.” We suggest that from an ideological, political, and constitutional perspective, Langford may
well be justified in saying that the topic has been exhausted. We
argue, however, that there is still room for a more finely grained
analysis of events and outcomes through our exploration of the
accounting evidence, particularly through the examination of
contemporary accounting documents not previously traversed in
detail in the literature. Rose and Miller [1992, p. 177] advocate
consideration of how the “state is articulated into the activity of
government, that is, the various elements, devices, techniques,
knowledge, to make operable the tactics of government.” In our
view, the failure of the Stamp Act can also be attributed to a
failure to consider the detail of achieving action at a distance.
In this regard, existing analyses of the Stamp Act crisis are deficient in that they fail to consider the logistical detail of how the
Stamp Act was to work. They also fail to examine the specific
items that were subject to the tax and the then-existing colonial
taxes.
This paper redresses these omissions by examining the accounts, together with other primary source documents detailing
the practicalities of the operation of the imperial Stamp Act.
The outcome is a better understanding of accounting, particularly tax accounting, in an imperial context, and an explanation
of the conditions under which a tax instrument successful in
one setting may fail in another. Accounting historians are well
aware of the neglect of accounts and accounting information by
historians. As Napier [1991] notes, in the context of aristocratic
accounting, historians readily draw on evidence of accounts but
rarely provide detailed descriptions of them. An accounting lens
can provide valuable, alternative explanations for events and

Published by eGrove, 2008
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transitions.2 It is not our intention to displace, or even disrupt,
established views of the origins of and motivations underpinning
the Stamp Act crisis. Rather, by using accounting evidence, we
aim to present another factor previously neglected by historians
to allow for an additional interpretation of the events. Much attention is given elsewhere to political rationalities in analyses of
government, including the ways in which power is exercised and
the role and extent of politics. Less attention is generally given
to the actual technologies deployed in putting governmental operations into practice [Rose and Miller, 1990, p. 175].
This paper also sheds light on the nature of 18th century
taxation in a colonial setting. The dearth of tax history in the accounting history literature has been discussed elsewhere [Lamb,
2003; Oats and Sadler, 2004; Noguchi, 2005]. The Stamp Act crisis represents an important episode in tax history. It highlights
the difficulties in imposing an imperial tax across the globe at a
time when communication mechanisms meant significant delays
in relaying information between the center in Britain and the
periphery in the colonies. Any tax is underpinned by accounting
techniques and practices, requiring their deployment by both
the taxing state and the taxed subject. The design of tax instruments is at one level driven by ideological considerations, but
putting a new tax into place and making it work requires careful
consideration of the practicalities of its operation and its impact
on those actors whose job it is to make the tax work effectively.
This paper adds to the accounting history literature in
three main ways. First, it adds to our understanding of accounting, particularly tax accounting, in an imperial context. Unlike
Hooper and Kearns [1997], Neu [1999, 2000], Kalpagam [2000],
Davie [2003], Bush and Maltby [2004], and Neu and Graham
[2006], we are not concerned with the use of accounting to control the indigenous populations of colonies. The object of this
investigation is imperial control over mid-18th century settler
colonists. Similarly, while work that deals with accounting in colonial America, such as Baxter [2004] and Schultz and Hollister
[2004], certainly exists, this paper is concerned with accounting
for colonial America. Second, it sheds light on the conditions
under which a tax instrument which is successful in one setting
fails to achieve that success in another, a failure to achieve ac2
Bryer [2000a, 2000b, 2004, 2005, 2006], for example, has shown that an accounting lens can be used to map the transition from feudalism to capitalism and
has thereby added a new dynamic to the debate around the emergence of capitalist mentalities.
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tion at a distance. Finally, the accounts drawn up by the British
government some six years after the abolition of the stamp duty
provide an interesting glimpse into the nature of government accounting in mid-18th century Britain. The accounts were not for
the purposes of “calculating the loss” on this failed venture, but
rather to reflect the stewardship obligations imposed on those
responsible for the collection of the tax. This is consistent with
the residual feudal mentality still extant in the mid-18th century.
While changes were under way in accounting for profit-making
ventures, in particular the adoption of double-entry bookkeeping, government accounts continued primarily to use charge and
discharge.
We conclude that the British Government underestimated
both the logistics of implementing a complex form of taxation
across vast geographical distances and the strength of the re
sistance movement in the local setting. The story of the imperial
Stamp Act is one of failure, and many explanations have been
posited for this failure. This study proposes another, previously
neglected, explanation, that the design of the operation of the
Stamp Act was flawed and the impracticalities of its implementation contributed significantly to its downfall. Successful
implementation of action at a distance requires a process of
translation [Robson, 1992; Preston, 2006] which the British government failed to achieve.
The remainder of this paper is comprised of three parts.
Part one begins with a short contextual review of the relationship between the American colonies and Britain. This is followed by an outline of both the rationale for the choice of stamp
duty as a fiscal instrument appropriate to extract revenue from
the colonists, and the accounting techniques by which it was
brought into existence and its intended maintenance. Part two
examines the colonial reaction to the tax and its subsequent
repeal. Part three offers some insights into the way in which
the short-lived Stamp Act was accounted for by the British
government bureaucracy, leaving aside the wider philosophical
and ideological debates which are, as noted above, dealt with
adequately elsewhere.
BACKGROUND: TAXATION IN AND OF
THE AMERICAN COLONIES
In 1700, there were only 200,000 inhabitants in the American colonies, but by 1770, its non-indigenous population had
risen to over two million [Plumb, 1963, p. 124]. By the mid-18th
Published by eGrove, 2008
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century, there were 13 British mainland colonies, together with
eight island colonies in the western Atlantic and Caribbean Sea,
each with representative institutions which enjoyed a certain
commonality despite markedly different economic and social
conditions. Each colony was separate from an imperial point
of view and had different initial forms of constitution, although
over the course of the first half of the 18th century, there was
a tendency “towards assimilation of colonial governments to a
single pattern” [Beloff, 1965, p. 448].
The governors of the colonies derived their functions from
the sovereign and acted as heads of civil administration. Assemblies were elected as decision-making bodies, although
“their legislative functions were subordinate to those of the
Imperial parliament” [Beloff, 1965, p. 448]. By the 18th century,
each colony was represented by an agent in London, men who
knew Westminster and were able to act as parliamentary lobbyists. Beloff [1965] notes that British attempts to tighten imperial
control had begun in the 1750s, but the Seven Years’ War3 intervened. Under mercantilist ideology, the reason for a colonial
empire was to derive economic benefit from it so that regulation
of trade was fundamental government policy. By 1763, however,
increasing evidence of evasion signaled the need for an overhaul
[Ritcheson, 1953, p. 544; Thomas, 1975, p. 44]. It was with
this in mind that Prime Minister Grenville’s administration of
1763-1765 acted as it did in relation to colonial legislation. For
Grenville, “it was a simple matter of justice that the eastern seaboard colonies who would profit greatly from a regulation of the
new west and who would enjoy military protection from attack,
should carry at least a share of the financial burden largely arising from services performed in their behalf” [Ritcheson, 1953,
p. 545]. While the colonists did not deny the imperial right to
regulate trade, they were opposed to the new rules regarding the
prosecution of offences, particularly the increased use of viceadmiralty courts.
Rationale for Stamp Duties: Stamp duties were first introduced
in Britain in 1694 and were a well-established and acceptable
form of taxation by the mid-18th century. Hughes [1941] provides a comprehensive discussion of their introduction and
development up to the period immediately preceding the Stamp

3

The Seven Years’ War is referred to as the French and Indian War in Amer-

ica.
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Act crisis.4 Blackstone [1766, pp. 312-313] described in his Commentaries the range and extent of British stamp duties. His list
included items such as parchment or paper containing details of
legal proceedings, licenses for retailing wines, almanacs, newspapers, advertisements, and pamphlets of less than six sheets
of paper. After noting that the tax greatly increased the cost of
mercantile and legal proceedings, Blackstone defended it as
providing a means of authenticating documents and that made
forgery more difficult.
Based on notions of fairness in taxation at the time, stamp
duties were an appropriate and widespread form of revenue
exaction. What is significant, in the context of this paper, is
that stamp duties require the cooperation of the taxpayer who
is responsible for ensuring that relevant documents and other
dutiable items are appropriately stamped. The attraction of
stamp duty as a revenue-raising measure to the state, compared
to other forms of taxation, is further demonstrated by a debate
that took place in the New York General Assembly [1766] during
which James Delancey on August 6, 1755, said:
I have thought of three of the following: a poll tax of
ten shillings or more on every slave from fifteen to fifty
years of age, an excise upon tea and a stamp duty. The
first cannot be thought heavy, as none but persons of
substance possess slaves, and the tax will fall equally
according to men’s abilities; the second is a tax upon a
superfluity of pernicious consequence to the health and
purses of the people, and therefore a proper object of a
tax, and the third [the stamp duty] will be so diffused as
to be in a manner insensible.
Diffuse incidence was seen as a virtue of the stamp tax in
that the burden was spread across a wider section of society. The
individual burden was thus lower than the more targeted forms
of tax aimed at the wealthy alone, such as land tax in Britain
and slave taxes in the colonies. On the other hand, another administrative virtue of the stamp tax was its visibility; payment of
the tax was denoted by a clear mark or cipher, an issue to which
we will return later in the paper.
By mid-century, Britain had established a sturdy financial
system, underpinned by “legions of new bureaucrats” (tax collectors and inspectors) as well as a “new consumer marketplace,”
4
See also Dowell [1873], although he does not canvass the full range of stamp
duties considering those such as on newspapers and playing cards to be aberrant
and focuses instead on duties placed on legal documents.
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developments which pre-date the industrial revolution and the
increased prominence of the middle class [Breen, 1997, p. 19].
Breen argues that these developments fed into the “birth of a
powerfully self confident British nationalism” (more narrowly,
English nationalism) which can be viewed as a factor contributing to the eventual rejection of the Stamp Act by the colonists.
The Treaty of Paris of 1763 ended the Seven Years’ War.
Bullion [1982, p. 12] suggests that the idea of colonial taxation
began to be discussed informally soon after.5 In March 1763,
the King wrote to Bute that “[t]he subject was new to none,
having been thought of the whole winter.” The King also noted
that “every branch of government” had considered the question
of taxing America. In June 1762, Charles Jenkinson, Secretary
to the Treasury, produced a paper entitled Observations on the
Money Faculties of the State in which he demonstrated that the
increased burden of taxation in Britain was £1,400,000 per annum. Consequently, he concluded that the government had no
choice but to impose new taxes, but as new taxes diminished
the revenue arising from old taxes, the nation’s capacity to meet
debts “was very considerably impaired.”6 Discussions about
the need for a new tax therefore revolved around accounting
calculations of the quantum of the national debt, the existing
burden of taxation in Britain, and the circumscribed potential to
increase that burden further.
The Treasury decision relating to the taxation of America
was not made purely on fiscal grounds. Commercial considerations also came into play; hence, Grenville’s statement to the
House of Commons that the “great object” of the proposals was
to “reconcile the regulation of commerce with an increase of

5
The idea of Britain imposing a stamp duty on the colonies was not new;
extension of the duty to the colonies had been suggested in 1722, 1726, 1728, and
1742 [Thomas, 1975, p. 69]. Sir W. Keith, exchequer-deputy governor of Virginia,
had also suggested it to Walpole in the wake of the 1733 excise crisis, who rejected
the idea, stating: “I have Old England set against me and do you think I will have
new England likewise” [Dowell, 1888, p. 150]? In 1751, Henry McCulloh, a London merchant with land speculation in North Carolina, suggested a stamp duty
for the colonies to Lord Halifax, the then-president of the Board of Trade, and, in
1757, submitted a scheme for a poll tax and a stamp duty [Ritcheson, 1953, p. 549;
Thomas, 1975, p. 69]. In addition, one of the secretaries to the treasury, Samuel
Martin, had, in 1759, recommended to Newcastle the imposition of a stamp tax
on the colonists [Bullion, 1982, p. 12].
6
Liverpool Papers [BM Add Ms 38334 f.233-238], quoted in Bullion [1982,
p. 19]
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revenue.”7 In Britain, there was a general acceptance of Parliament’s authority, and taxes were on the whole paid regularly
(that is not to say there was no tax evasion). In planning to tax
the colonies, resistance was anticipated as the government
recognized that similar conditions did not pertain there. This
awareness influenced the choice of tax instrument to be adopted
[Bullion, 1982, p. 2]. Grenville and his ministers were acutely attuned to the need to secure colonial support for their decisions
and that the prevailing mood in the American colonies was not
receptive to imperial interference.
It was against this background that on March 9, 1764,
Grenville announced his intention to levy a stamp duty on the
colonies in a year’s time. This statement was made at the time
of the passage through Parliament of the Sugar Act. Grenville
stated that in delaying the introduction of a stamp duty, he was
allowing the colonies to formulate alternative plans for raising
revenue, although it seems that this was not made explicit to the
colonial assemblies [Morgan, 1973, p. 24].8 In Grenville’s opinion, the Stamp Act was an appropriate basis for Anglo-American
relations, putting British and colonial taxpayers on the same
footing and establishing that America should rightly contribute
to the cost of its defense [Lawson, 1980, p. 561].
One significant factor which may have led Grenville to
choose a stamp duty for the colonies is the prior use of such
taxes by the colonies themselves. Although not specifically discussed in Kozub’s [1983] wide-ranging survey of colonial taxes, a
stamp duty was used in Massachusetts in 1755 and New York in
1757. The New York tax included a stamp duty of ½d. per copy
on newspapers, against which James Parker protested [McAnear, 1941], drawing on the arguments of Swift in relation to the
British newspaper stamp introduced in 1712 [Sadler and Oats,
2002]. Thompson [1969, p. 257] is of the view that there was
little popular resistance to these duties, which may well have directly encouraged Grenville to use a stamp duty to raise colonial
revenue. In addition, the use of stamp duties in the colonies was
not confined to the mainland colonies. In Jamaica, a stamp duty
was imposed from 1760 to 1763 to provide revenues to fund the
militia in the face of a slave revolt [Spindel, 1977, p. 210].

7

in a speech of March 9, 1965, Ryder Diary [p. 234], quoted in Bullion [1982,

p. 2]
8
Thomas [1975, p. 72] disputes Morgan’s assertion in this regard and is of the
view that Grenville did not intend to seek the views of the colonies.
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DESIGNING THE IMPERIAL STAMP DUTY
Having decided to adopt a stamp duty as the most appropriate form of tax in the colonies, it then became necessary to devise specific mechanisms by which it would operate. Miller and
Rose [1990, p. 2] comment that through “apparently humble
and mundane mechanisms” such as “techniques of notation,
computation and calculation,” action at a distance can “incite,
induce and seduce populations to behave in certain ways.”9
Robson [1992, pp. 691-693, 696], drawing on Latour [1987,
1988], discusses the development of accounting as inscriptions
that enable action at a distance. He notes that relations between
inscriptions and the things to which they refer are not unambiguous, and the extent to which they correspond is influenced
by the distance between them. Co-location of representation and
referent minimizes the need for “strong” explanations to achieve
action, in part due to tacit knowledge shared by the actors. Action at a distance, on the other hand, is more problematic, and
the greater the distance between the actor and the location in
which the desired action is to take place, the greater the need
for translation. Here translation suggests “movement or displacement from one context to another.” To act upon a remote
site, networks are required to “gather, transmit and assimilate
transcriptions.” Robson goes on to describe the features of
transcriptions best able to achieve action at a distance, specifically mobility, stability, and combinability. Mobility is required
since inscriptions need to be able to “move from the setting to
actor and back,” an attribute of written documents which can
be inspected and re-inspected. Stability ensures that inscriptions
retain the relation to their referents without corruption. Robson
notes, by reference to Hoskin and Macve [1986], that the development of special ways of writing such as alphabetic ordering
“enhanced the ability of texts to record, reference and retrieve
information.” The final property of inscriptions that facilitates
action at a distance is combinability; that is, the ability to be
combined and recombined “to establish new relationships.” Accounting, with its numerical inscription, is capable of playing an
important role in achieving action at a distance. By quantifying,
or ascribing monetary values to concepts, they can be combined
to form a new concept.
In drawing up a suitable plan for the imposition of a stamp
9
The term “government” here is used in the Foucauldian sense of the attempt
to shape rational human conduct beyond its modern political meaning. See, for
example, Neu [1999].
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duty on the colonies, thought was given to the nature of the duties imposed in Britain, while some consideration was also given
to the special circumstances of the American colonies, such as
differences in legal systems and higher levels of poverty. The
governors of the colonies were requested to produce an account
of legal documents in use in the colonies. This information, together with the Massachusetts and New York versions of stamp
duty, was used to assist in deciding to what the imperial stamp
would apply (referred to as “heads of duty”) and at what rate. A
table was drawn up showing the current British heads and rates
of duty side by side with the colonial duties [N.A.: T1/433/141].
These accounts of the local position demonstrate the way in
which inscriptions are gathered from their remote location,
combined and recombined at the center, and used to design a
plan of action to be put into effect back in the local setting.
Work began on the stamp bill in 1763, with two draft versions submitted to the Treasury for consideration on November
19, 1763. The version preferred by the Treasury was one drawn
up by Thomas Cruwys, solicitor to the Stamp Office.10 Thomas
Whately, joint secretary to the Treasury Board, presented a
report to the Board outlining the features and rationale of the
stamp bill. He stated that the rates of duty in the colonies were
necessarily different to those in England as the same legal instruments were not always used in both places and, in some instances, a different rate of duty may be appropriate for the same
instrument.11
Whately’s report recommended two new heads of duty in
the colonies. One was on Crown grants of land and the other on
registration of conveyances and securities; that is, the registers
themselves were taxed as well as the legal documents. In comparison with the duties in place in Britain, higher duties in the
colonies were proposed for the system of registering transfers
of land. In addition, for reasons that are not clear, the decision
10
The other version was drafted by Henry �����������������������������������
McCulloh, who was largely in agreement with Cruwys as to the nature of the duties that should be imposed, but differed as to the use to which the funds should be put. Cruwys did not specify how
the funds raised were to be deployed, whereas McCulloh apparently held strong
views on this and believed the revenue arising from the stamp duty should be used
“to provide presents for Indians; to pay rangers for frontiers; for the maintenance
of the king’s forts and garrisons; to encourage settlers and settlements in frontier
parts”; and finally, “to discharge the salaries of the kings [sic] governors and officers abroad” [quoted in Thomas, 1975, p. 71].
11
The full text of Whately’s report can be found in BM Add Ms 35910 f.310323 and is partly reproduced in Hughes [1941] and Koeppel [1976].
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was taken to subject documents in foreign languages (including newspapers) to double the rate of duty. There were to be
lower duties in the colonies for legal proceedings and bonds in
light of the higher levels of both poverty and litigiousness in the
colonies. The rate of duty on retail licenses for the sale of ale,
cider, and spirits was also lower than in Britain. Two items of
duty which applied in Britain were not imposed in the colonies,
specifically that on admission to corporations and that on indentures.12
The final bill was handed to the Treasury on January 24,
1764 [Thomas, 1975, p. 71]. As noted earlier, in deciding how the
stamp duty would operate, to which instruments and objects it
would apply, and to what extent, some consideration was given
to the particular circumstances of the colonies. It is not possible
merely to recreate rules and regulations that exist in another
location. Success of regulatory control is dependent on its being tailored for the specific circumstances of the location of its
operation.13 As noted by Robson [1992], the greater the distance
from the center of decision making to the location of enactment,
the more translation or information is required to overcome the
difficulties of distance. Information about legal instruments in
use in the colonies played an important role in the design of the
stamp duties, in choosing which documents would be subjected
to the duties, and how much tax would be charged on each.
One factor which was not taken into account in deciding
what form an imperial tax should take, which is also a neglected
area in the historiography of the Stamp Act crisis, is the extent
to which the colonial assemblies imposed other forms of taxes,
often with great ingenuity. It seems that the British government
failed to consider adequately the nature of the other taxes in
place or had been previously imposed in the individual colonies.
Kozub [1983] documents the array of taxes imposed by the colonial governments and concludes that the “colonial forefathers”
attempted in their design of tax instruments to measure the faculty or ability of individuals to pay the taxes. Indeed, several col12
Other heads of duty remained largely the same and taxes at the same rates
as in Britain. It was decided to retain the duty on admission to professions and
degrees so as to “keep mean persons out of those situations in life which they
disgrace” [BM Add Ms 35910].
13
In a contemporary tax context, a growing body of research deals with this
notion. See, for example, the work of the Centre for Tax System Integrity at the
Australian National University (http://ctsi.anu.edu.au/) and Law and Policy (2007),
volume 29, issue 1, which is devoted to the notion of responsive regulation in taxation.
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onies imposed taxes actually designated as “faculty taxes” which
were taxes on the assumed income of specific occupations. In
Connecticut, for example, it applied to attorneys. Residents of
Massachusetts, in particular, were heavily taxed compared to
other colonies.14 The imposition of an imperial stamp duty then
would impact unevenly throughout the colonies, which raised
questions akin to those subsequently debated in the context of
federal taxing powers.15
Grenville intended to introduce the stamp duty in 1764. In
his budget speech of that year, he indicated that he considered
the stamp duty to be the “least exceptionable because it requires
fewer officers and even collects itself. The only danger is forgery” [Thomas, 1975, p. 74]. Clearly Grenville failed to appreciate
the complexity of implementing the tax in the colonies and the
extent to which it would inflame the colonists. Objections were
raised during debate, however, and the progress of the bill was
halted. Opponents suggested that the colonies should be apprised of Parliament’s intentions [Thomas, 1975]. The response
from the colonies was a series of protests sent by the assemblies
of Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, New York, North
Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Virginia.
As concern over the implications of a colonial stamp tax
rose, the colonial agents met with Grenville on May 17, 1765 to
clarify the position. There are several accounts by witnesses to
this meeting, including one by Jasper Mauduit whose brother
was present and who reported the meeting to the Massachusetts
Assembly on May 26, 1765 [Morgan, 1973, p. 27]. Echoing Grenville’s 1764 budget speech, Mauduit stated that Grenville had
suggested that, of the available forms of taxation, “the stamps
was the most equal, required the fewest officers, and was attended with the least Expence in the Collecting it.” Recognizing
14
 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������
There are a number of individual studies of the taxes in various colonies prior to independence. Gipson [1931, p. 721] examines the tax burdens on residents
of Connecticut, which Jared Ingersoll said in 1765 was: “Eighty Thousand Pounds
in Debt, Arrears of Taxes, that cannot be collected by Reason of the Poverty of
these on whom they are laid.” Henderson [1990] notes the difference with respect
to colonial taxation and subsequent state taxation between the Chesapeake and
New England colonies, particularly Massachusetts and Virginia. He attributes
these variations to differences in cultural and demographic factors, including the
prevalence of slaves, which affected the types of tax instrument used in those
colonies as well as the incidence of taxes.
15
Crane [2006] discusses the first federal stamp taxes imposed in 1798, and
their role in the downfall of the Federalists. Notwithstanding the grant of taxing
power to the federal government, there were persistent concerns that some measures were too intrusive upon state autonomy.
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that the preferred choice would be no tax at all, but given the
necessity of imposing some form of revenue-raising measure,
the colonies were expected to assent or request appropriate
modifications. When one of the colonial agents asked for details
of the heads of duty, Grenville apparently replied that “it was not
necessary. That everyone knows the stamp laws here; and that
this Bill is intended to be form’d upon the same plan.” Benjamin
Franklin proposed an alternative to the stamp duty as a means
of raising colonial revenue in the form of a plan for a paper
currency for the colonies. Later, in 1766, he reflected that “Mr.
Grenville paid little attention to it [Franklin’s alternative proposal], being besotted with his Stamp Scheme, which he rather
chose to carry through” [Labaree, 1968, p. 48].
In another conference with four of the colonial agents on
February 2, 1765, an attempt was made to forestall the implementation of the Stamp Act. By the time the bill reached its
second reading on February 15, the agents presented colonial
petitions against it, which were not, however, admitted into the
House of Commons [Morgan, 1973].
It seems that there was a change in the underlying purpose
of the Stamp Act during the 12-month delay in its implementation. On November 5, 1764, Whately explained to John Temple,
Surveyor General of Customs for the Northern District of America, that finance was the motivation behind the bill. By February
9, 1765, once the colonies’ objections to the new tax were known
in Britain, he stated that “it establishes the right of Parliament
to levy an internal tax on the colonies” [Thomas, 1975, p. 85].
The “peel of remonstrance which sounded across the Atlantic found an echo” in England where merchants were concerned
about the ability of the Americans to pay their debts, which at
the time were apparently in the vicinity of £4,000,000 [Dowell,
1888, p. 152]. “The Grenville ministry did not proceed with the
Stamp Act in ignorance of colonial opinion, but thought the
measure would be accepted without protest” [Thomas, 1975, p.
88]. We return to the question of the colonial resistance in the
next section of the paper.
During the passage of the bill, 28 speeches were made by
18 different members; there were 55 resolutions and numerous alterations and additions which prolonged its passage by
two days. There was no debate in the House of Lords, and the
Commons was informed on March 8 that the bill had passed
without amendment. Royal assent was received on March 22,
1765 [Thomas, 1975, p. 98]. After the third reading of the bill on
February 27, Thomas Cruwys drew up the bonds for the stamp
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol35/iss2/5
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distributors. Over 50 different duties were imposed, the highest
being £10 on licenses for solicitors and attorneys. There was
little opposition in either the House of Commons or the Lords;
indeed, according to Burke, “[t]here scarcely ever was less opposition to a bill of consequence.”16 In addition, there was little indication that the tax would be as controversial as it subsequently
turned out to be [Sosin, 1958].
In support of the contention that the act was carefully designed for colonial sensibilities, Thomas [1975, p. 99] notes five
points which represent reasons why the measure should have
been acceptable to the colonists:
1. the total tax to be raised by the bill was quite small;
2. the stamp duty was chosen as it was considered to be
equitable in terms of its burden;
3. the detailed variations from the British duties at the time
reflected careful consideration of the particular circumstances in the colonies;
4. the money raised by the tax was to stay in the colonies
(although there was some confusion in this regard); and
5. it was to be administered by leading men resident in the
various colonies.
The choice of a stamp duty to extract revenue from the colonists was sensible for Britain on a number of grounds. The impact of the tax was not concentrated onto one particular section,
such as the wealthy, but was widely dispersed across a broad
cross-section of colonial society. The design of the administration of the tax was also such that it required the active participation of taxpayers. Evidence of payment of the tax was highly
visible, and, yet, because it was built into the cost of undertaking the transaction that was the subject of the duty, it could be
interpreted as merely an increase in ultimate price compared
to other taxes, such as the tax on slaves, which required payment without anything visible being received in return. These
justifications seem reasonable on the face of it, but as will be
discussed below, an interpretation of the accounts in Figure 1
suggest that the way in which policy makers envisaged that the
stamp duty would operate was unduly complex and insensitive
to the situation in the affected colonies.

16
Edmund Burke’s “Speech on American Taxation” [quoted in Dowell, 1888,
p. 150]. For the full text of this speech, see Langford [1981, pp. 406-462].
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PUTTING THE STAMP DUTY INTO OPERATION
The administration of the stamp duty was to be tightly
controlled by the British stamp commissioners. In presenting
the final proposals for the stamp duty to the Treasury Board,
Whately discussed the additional costs of administering the
new tax, specifically “an increase in salary to the Secretary, the
Receiver General and Comptroller, a small increase in salary to
the first clerks of those officers, two additional clerks…[and] an
additional porter to the warehouse and [almost as an aside] a
warehouse” [BM Add Ms 35910 f.323].
It was recommended that the British authorities be responsible for the supply of all the stamped paper and parchment,
and it was conceded that “the quantities…may be difficult to
ascertain at first, but…will be easy to furnish afterwards.” This
deserves a little more thought, bearing in mind the number of
objects of this tax and the different denominations of duty potentially applicable, it is quite an understatement to suggest that
the quantities may be “difficult to ascertain.” To determine what
types of paper were to use for which transactions and to arrange
for them to be stamped using one of 30 dies specially designed
for the purpose was difficult enough. But then to further allocate these sheets among the 13 mainland colonies and the
island colonies, all of which had different degrees of commercial
sophistication, was an enormous accounting task. In addition to
the calculation of the value of the stamps, the cost of the paper
and parchment also had to be computed and marked on the paper. In this way, the government also controlled the price which
taxpayers ultimately paid for the paper they were forced to use
in order to comply with the tax.
It was intended that, at least initially, the paper be stamped
in London and then transported to the colonies for dispatch to
the various stamp distributors appointed in each colony. This
may have been an interim measure to get the Stamp Act up and
running. Certainly Benjamin Franklin indicated by letter of June
8, 1765 to his partner David Hall an expectation that a stamp
office would be set up in Philadelphia for stamping paper for
newspapers and almanacs in due course [Labaree, 1968, p. 65].
The stamps that were prepared for use for stamping colonial
newspapers were of three values – halfpenny, penny, and twopence. The design of the stamps consisted of a royal crown with
the sword and scepter crossed at the back in the center of the
stamp, surrounded by the garter with the inscription honi soit
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qui mal y pense.17 Above the garter band was heraldic mantling
with the word “America” at the top [Turner, 1941]. Figure 2
shows the purchase of blank paper and parchment from Tonson
& Co. stationers, subsequently placed in the charge of the warehouse keeper of unstamped goods. The values at which these
transactions were recorded appear to be historical cost.
FIGURE 2
American Stamp Duties General Account by
Virtue of an Act of Parliament &c Tonson & Co Stationers
£
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Source: N.A. AO3/1086

Unlike Continental European incarnations of the stamp
duty, such as in France where the government had a monopoly
over the stamped paper and its supply, the paper for the British
version was purchased by taxpayers, taken to the stamp office
for stamping, and then used as required (e.g., overprinted as
newspapers). This system could not feasibly be instituted in the
American colonies without costly investment in the stamping
equipment necessary to stamp the paper. In this regard, however, three colonies had previously levied their own stamp duties
and presumably had the equipment in place to facilitate stamping there. This is one of the problematic operational features of
the Stamp Act which exacerbated the resistance to it. Forcing
taxpayers to purchase pre-stamped paper shipped from Britain
provided a constant and visible reminder of the nature of the
tax as an imperial imposition. Had the paper been stamped in
situ, its visibility as an externally imposed duty would have been
17
the motto of the Order of the Garter, which can be loosely translated as
“Shame on he who thinks evil of it”
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diminished. In addition, the accounts in Figure 1 show that it
was commercial stationers who provided the paper and that two
warehouse keepers were employed in its storage and handling.
These factors were additional cost and administrative burdens
borne in Great Britain, but any ancillary benefits, such as business and employment opportunities, accrued to Great Britain.
If the colonies themselves had been entrusted with the local
procurement, stamping, and storage of paper, providing employment for colonists and furthering business in the colonies, there
would have been some benefit in amelioration of the burden,
and the stamp duty may have been better received.
For the purposes of the administration of the Stamp Act, the
colonies were divided into nine districts, each with an inspector
answerable to a new American Stamp Office of five commissioners in London [Thomas, 1975, p. 100]. The districts were subdivided into areas for which stamp distributors were responsible
(see Figure 4). The creation of a new tax with its concomitant
administrative structure provided opportunities for new roles.
In the mid-18th century, patronage was the norm. Not surprisingly, therefore, ambitious men saw opportunities for profit and
advancement in obtaining posts within the new administrative
structure. Of paramount importance to the successful administration of the stamp duty was the role of stamp distributor. It
was proposed that a head distributor be appointed in the capital
of each province that “must be a responsible person and give
large security.” The head distributor would be charged with storing and distributing the stamped paper, collecting the appropriate tax, and remitting it to the British exchequer. Distributors
were to be remunerated by an 8% commission on monies collected and were reimbursed for postage and carriage costs [N.A.
T1/439 f.93].
There was some competition for the stamp distributor posts,
which is a fairly clear indication that the violence of the resistance was not anticipated. Three Americans in London at the
time secured posts – Colonel Mercer from Virginia, Jared Ingersoll for Connecticut, and George Meserve from New Hampshire.
On May 14, 1765, Martin Howard Jr., a Rhode Island lawyer,
wrote to Benjamin Franklin seeking his support for a post in the
stamp office [Labaree, 1968, pp. 129-130]:
The English prints acquaint Us that it is probable, a Native of each Colony will be appointed Receiver of Stamp
Duties. Should this be the Case, it may possibly fall in
your Way, as you are an American, to recommend some
persons for that purpose. If no other Connection claims
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol35/iss2/5
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the Preference, I would ask your Friendship to name me
for that office, or any other in the Stamp Office which
you may think worth accepting…”
Sensitive to the possibility of resistance, these new distributors were proposed to be Americans to avoid inflaming colonists
by imposing British tax collectors upon them. The appointment
of Americans to the role of distributor can be interpreted as an
attempt to form an actor network necessary to implement action
in the local setting [Preston, 2006, p. 561].
In recognition that a large volume of the stamped paper
would be used for legal matters, it was proposed to use the
clerks of county and circuit courts to assist in the distribution
of stamped paper to more remote locations. The distribution
of stamped paper and collection of the tax would be overseen
by inspectors, as it was in Britain, who would be empowered to
travel across the colonies and act as auditors of the collection
process. Inspectors were to receive a salary of £100 per annum, commencing on the day of leaving England, plus 20s. per
diem to cover expenses of traveling in the course of their duties
[T1/439 f.92].
FIGURE 3
Warehouse Keeper of Stampt Goods
1765
£
s D
1765
£
s D
Oct 31st to Stampt
By sundry
goods received
172,586 11 1¾
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1766
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222,506 11 6½

Source: N.A.: AO3/1086

Figure 3 is the top part of an account which shows the
receipt of stamped paper from the teller to whom it had been
passed by the warehouse keeper of unstamped goods. Figure 3
also shows how the warehouse keeper of stamped goods dealt
with the consignment of stamped paper received from the teller.
Paper and parchment to the value of £172,586.11s.1¾d. was
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consigned to the distributors appointed in the American colonies. The value of the paper and parchment in this account appears to be inclusive of the stamp duty. Figure 4 is an extract
from a “distributors’ abstract” which shows how this first consignment of stamped paper was allocated among the various
colonial distributors. For the purposes of this section, only the
first five columns are relevant. Figure 4 serves to reinforce the
complexity of the calculations required to achieve this result.
Based on the returns previously provided by the governors of
each colony as to the nature and type of transactions conducted
at each location, decisions were taken as to the volume of each
size and type of paper and parchment that would be required
to meet the needs of each individual colony. The reason for the
transfers from Montreal to Quebec and back (see Figure 7 for
the contra entries) is not clear. The allocation of identical values
of paper to Bermuda and the Bahamas would appear to be arbitrary and related to there being only one distributor responsible
for both locations. This account of the consignments for each
distributor shows the way in which combinability is brought
into play as a feature of accounting inscriptions necessary to enable action at a distance [Robson, 1992].
Another potential sensitivity to be addressed in the design
of the stamp duty was the way in which the proceeds were to be
remitted to the British exchequer. Specie was in short supply in
the colonies at the time, and there was concern that this duty
would further drain the supply. It is not clear whether the original intention was to ship the proceeds of the Stamp Act back
to His Majesty’s exchequer in Britain. The Act, when passed,
required that the duties be paid in sterling values at 5s. 6d. per
ounce of silver [5 Geo III: C12 s57]. The pragmatic response to
these concerns was addressed by Whately as follows [BM Add
Ms 35910 f.323]:
The expense and hazard of remitting the money to be
raised by this duty may be saved, and the complaint
of draining the country of money may be obviated by
a transaction between the Paymaster General and the
Commissioner of Stamps…
It was not until July 1765, however, that the Treasury Board ordered that receipts be paid over to the deputy paymaster of the
army in America, with a series of credit transactions in England
with the Treasury then reconciling the accounts of the offices
involved [N.A.: T1/439 f.94]. In this way, the Treasury envisaged
using accounting mechanisms to deal with the flow of funds
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol35/iss2/5
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rather than the physical transfer of specie. Certainly this became
a point of contention in subsequent protests, and the confusion
as to whether or not the Stamp Act would be a drain on colonial
specie [Sosin, 1958] arose largely because of delays in communication between the imperial center and the colonial periphery.
While considerable care had been undertaken in the design
of the new measures to ensure they were appropriately adapted
to colonial conditions, there were several potential problem
areas, particularly for the fledgling colonial paper-making and
printing industries. On February 14, 1765, Benjamin Franklin
wrote to his partner in the Pennsylvania Gazette that: “I think it
will affect the printers more than anybody” [Schlesinger, 1935,
p. 66]. The tax on advertisements dealt a bitter blow for colonial
newspaper advertisements, which generally cost from 2s. to 5s.
local currency, and to which the addition of a 2s. stamp duty
would then add, possibly putting advertising out of the reach
of many businesses and so reducing the profitability of newspapers. It was expected that the duty on advertisements would
be reduced to 1s. but, according to Benjamin Franklin, the
reduction “slipt in passing the bill” [Labaree, 1968, p. 170].18 In
a letter to his partner David Hall on June 8, 1765, he remained
optimistic, however, that it would be altered, with other refinements, in the next sitting of Parliament. In addition, the Stamp
Act required payment in advance of a security for the advertising
duty by the printers before the stamped paper could be obtained
as was the practice in Britain [Labaree, 1968, p. 65, fn. 3]. In a
letter to a colleague on February 14, 1765, Benjamin Franklin
said [Labaree, 1968, p. 68]:
Every Step in the Law, every Newspaper, Advertisement and Almanack is severely tax’d…. If this should,
as I imagine it will, occasion less Law, and less Printing,
‘twill fall particularly hard on us Lawyers and Printers.
In addition, there were problems with differences in the sizes
and quality of paper used. For example, in Britain, almanacs
were generally printed on foolscap paper sized 17x13½ inches,
and it seems the original intention was to ship foolscap to the
colonies pre-stamped for use in printing almanacs. In Pennsylvania, however, almanacs were produced using Demi paper
18
It seems, however, that he was pragmatic about the tax and viewed it as an
opportunity as well as a threat. He secured the post of stamp distributor in Philadelphia for a friend. He also ordered “100 reams of half-sheets of extraordinary
size, the kind used by the London Chronicle, in the hope of avoiding the penny tax”
[Labaree, 1968, p. 65, see also, Schlesinger, 1935, p. 67].
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sized 20x15½ inches. It seems that Benjamin Franklin was able
to intervene and have Demi sent instead, albeit of a lesser quality than the foolscap [Labaree, 1968, p. 171]. English paper was
more expensive, which made the cost of complying with the
Stamp Act even higher than just the tax itself [Koeppel, 1976, p.
58].
The requirement to have paper and parchment stamped in
Britain and then shipped to the colonies was potentially devastating to colonial paper mills. In a letter printed in the London
Chronicle, August 17-20, 1765, attributed to Charles Thompson
[Labaree, 1968, p. 186]:
The paper mills, nursed with care and brought to so
great perfection in this province [Philadelphia] must
now fall, at the same time the business and trade of the
Printers is ruined...
Having examined the motivation for the choice of tax
instrument and the manner in which it was expected to be administered, the next part of the paper examines the colonial response to the tax. As mentioned earlier, one difference with this
analysis, compared with other studies of colonial accounting, is
that the Stamp Act was a failed measure. The colonial resistance
proved strong enough to force the imperial government to withdraw the tax a mere six months after the commencement of its
operation. Another difference is that this study considers all of
the colonies rather than just the mainland colonies, which more
adequately reveals the complexity of the colonial response.
THE COLONIAL RESPONSE
Breen [1997, p. 27] marks the 1760s as a turning point,
prior to which the American colonists were fiercely loyal and
saw themselves as a valued part of the empire, with equal standing to British residents. “They believed that the English accepted
them as full partners in the British Empire, allies in the continuing wars against France, devout defenders of Protestantism,
and eager participants in an expanding identity.” A significant
feature of the colonial response to the Stamp Act was the way
in which it brought the disparate colonies together. The effect
of British policy subsequent to the Peace of Paris had not been
even throughout the colonies; for example, the Sugar Act of
1764 did not affect the southern colonies as much as it did New
England or the port towns [Pole, 1973, p. 36]. One key difference with the Stamp Act was its universal impact; it affected all
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colonies, all of which shared a mutual interest in opposing the
measure. Colonial ministers preached resistance to the Stamp
Act, drawing on philosophers such as Milton, Sydney, and Locke
[Van Tyne, 1913]. Colonial assemblies met to produce various
resolutions and petitions, while printed newspapers and pamphlets added fuel to the fires of resistance. This neither implies
that the response was uniform nor that there was unanimity in
the grounds for or against the tax.
In the British view, the right to tax was disassociated with
the right to parliamentary representation since at the time only
a small proportion of Englishmen themselves were represented
[Beloff, 1965]. Brewer [1988, p. 375] notes that “the extent of
tax resistance in those territories where the legitimacy of parliamentary jurisdiction was challenged” underlined the importance
of “parliamentary consent in securing effective tax gathering.”
The colonists distinguished between internal and external taxes
and were prepared to accept external duties, the main purpose
of which was to regulate trade. Internal taxes (i.e., those for the
purpose of revenue raising) were considered to be the province
of colonial assemblies. In evidence to the Stamp Committee of
1766, Benjamin Franklin, agent for Philadelphia, stated: “I never
heard any objection to the right of laying duties to regulate commerce, but a right to lay internal taxes was never supposed to
be in parliament, as we were not represented there” [Labaree,
1969, p. 137]. Earlier, in 1764, Franklin had said: “two distinct
Jurisdictions or Powers of Taxing cannot well subsist together in
the same Country. They will confound and obstruct each other”
[Slaughter, 1984, p. 4]. There is some debate among historians
as to how enduring the distinction between internal and external
taxes was. Wood [1969] maintains that it was dropped after the
Stamp Act crisis, whereas Bailyn [1967] sees it as part of a wider
distinction between internal and external government. The
Morgans [1953] were of the view that the distinction was never a
popular one. Slaughter [1984], however, maintains that the distinction remained significant throughout the pre-revolutionary
period and beyond because it was never really resolved.
News of the Act reached the colonies in April 1765 and,
subsequently, a number of resolutions were passed opposing the
Act, first in the Virginian House of Burgesses on May 30, 1765,
followed by the other colonies. The stamp, which in Britain
represented evidence of contribution towards the cost of state
protection, discharge of an obligation, and acknowledgement of
Parliament’s legitimate right to impose taxes, took on a different
complexion in the colonies.
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On October 7, 1765, the Stamp Act Congress was held in
New York, attended by 27 delegates from nine colonies and
culminating in 14 declarations of principle [Morgan, 1973]. The
eighth of these stated that the “rights and liberties of the colonists” were subverted by the Stamp Act [Morgan, 1973, p. 45].
A memorial to the House of Lords from the colonists expressed
concern on similar grounds; this was one of several memorials
and petitions sent to various bodies in Britain [Morgan, 1973,
p. 66]. The two fundamental “rights” referred to were the right
to trial by jury and the right to “exemption from taxes but such
as are imposed on the People by the several Legislatures in these
Colonies” [Morgan, 1973, p. 66]. A petition to the House of Commons pointed out that there would be serious consequences
for the commercial interests of Great Britain and her colonies
should the Stamp Act be put into effect [Morgan, 1973, p. 67].
In addition to the resolutions and petitions formulated by
the colonial assemblies, the American press was galvanized to
report the news and to argue the colonial view. A number of
newspaper articles and pamphlets were published registering
the outrage of the colonies. Before 1765, “newspapers were
relatively unimportant as agencies for moulding and reporting
public opinion” [Dickerson, 1951, p. 454]. In the English press,
on the other hand, while many were supportive of the colonial
arguments, others considered the Stamp Act just and equitable.
The various responses to the Stamp Act, both in the colonies and
in Britain, are well documented elsewhere.
As well as the official action taken by the colonial assemblies, resistance to the Stamp Act comprised boycotting of
English imports and action to force the resignation of stamp
distributors [Morgan, 1973, p. 104]. The first manifestation of
violence in the context of the latter of the two resistance strategies was in Boston on August 14, 1765, followed by Newport on
August 29, 1765.
The Stamp Act further aggravated the growing antagonism
toward heightened British interference partly because, as Schles
inger [1935, p. 65] pointed out, it was the printers, lawyers, and
merchants who bore the brunt of the impost, and these were
the people who “formed the most literate and articulate section
of the colonial public”. David Ramsay [Schlesinger, 1935, p. 65]
said:
It was fortunate for the liberties of America, that Newspapers were the subject of a heavy stamp duty. Printers, when uninfluenced by government, have generally
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 rranged themselves on the side of liberty, nor are they
a
less remarkable for attention to the profits of their profession. A Stamp Duty, which openly invaded the first,
and threatened a great diminution of the last, provided
their united zealous opposition.
In the main, however, the colonies largely disregarded the
Act although the formation of the Sons of Liberty, an “intercolonial union for the purpose of resisting enforcement of the
Stamp Act” [Morgan, 1973, p. 105], was complete by the end of
that year. Fueled by the rhetoric of the Sons of Liberty, public
opinion turned towards securing the resignation of the stamp
officers prior to the starting date of November 1, 1765. By midAugust 1765, riots had commenced and spread throughout the
colonies [Schlesinger, 1935, p. 72]. Schlesinger was of the view
that it was the ceaseless propaganda of the press which kept
the public mind at fever pitch. In a letter to the commissioner
of stamps, dated October 12, 1765, one of the victims, John
Hughes, stamp distributor for Pennsylvania, said “the printers
in each colony, almost without exception, stuffed their papers
weekly for some time before with the most inflammatory pieces
they could procure and excluded everything that tended to cool
the minds of the people.”
As previously noted, not all the colonies reacted in the same
way to the Stamp Act, and in Pennsylvania, for example, Quaker
conservatism prevailed and violent resistance was avoided
[Newcomb, 1966, p. 272]. “Nova Scotia, alone of all the colonies
on the seaboard, submitted without opposition to the laying
of stamp duties. In her settlement there were no riots, no nonimportation agreements and apparently, except for Liverpool, no
murmurs” [Weaver, 1904, 58]. In most of the colonies, there was
serious rioting when the stamped paper arrived, and some of the
stamped paper was seized and burned. The officially appointed
stamp distributors found themselves to be in such a perilous
situation that they resigned en masse, with the exception of the
distributor in Georgia, George Angus, who arrived well-guarded
in Georgia with the stamps in late 1765. During January 1766,
about 60 ships offloaded stamped paper in Savannah. This activity angered the other colonies and also those inhabitants of
Georgia not resident in Savannah, “for their betrayal of American unity” [Koeppel, 1962, p. 10]. Learning that there was to be
a mob march on Savannah, the governor dispatched the stamps
out to a British warship. Koeppel records that the stamps were
used in Quebec, Nova Scotia, Florida, and some of the West
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Indian colonies, namely Antigua, Barbados, Grenada, and Jamaica.
Spindel [1977] analyzes, in particular, the reaction of the
colonies in the British West Indies.19 On the whole, their response was moderate in comparison with the mainland colonies
although, even in the West Indies, “the response of each colony
was unique, determined by differences in history and environment.” 20 The government in the West Indies was similar to
that in North America with some inevitable differences based
largely on demographic factors, such as smaller populations and
higher proportions of slaves. In addition, the chief executives
in the West Indies enjoyed significant financial privileges and
had powerful representatives in London. Other forces which
underlined the differences between the Caribbean colonies and
North American colonies included the “lack of cultural life, the
scarcity of land, geographic isolation, a debilitating climate, and
exposure to attacks from French and Spanish ships” [Spindel,
1977, p. 207]. Throughout the colonies, both mainland and island, stamp officials were attacked and abused, stamp distributors burned in effigy and their families threatened, and stamped
paper was stolen and destroyed.
Numerous petitions were received from America and, in
February 1766, the House of Commons appointed a parliamentary committee to inquire into the operation of the Stamp Act.
Before the committee reported, Grenville was dismissed from
office and, following some difficult negotiations, administration
was formed under the Marquis of Rockingham for whom Edmund Burke acted as private secretary.
The depth of colonial resistance to the Stamp Act, albeit
not uniform, rendered it impossible to enforce. It became clear
to the new ministry that compliance with the stamp duty could
not be obtained. The question arose as to whether, given that the
Stamp Act was not self-enforcing as originally envisaged, mili19
In 1765, the British colonies in the West Indies were the Bahamas, Jamaica,
and the lesser Antilles, comprising Anguilla, Antigua, Barbados, Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, Nevis, St. Kitts, St. Vincent, Tobago, and Tortola.
20
Reaction varied across the island colonies. Jamaica and Barbados, for example, showed only token resistance to the Stamp Act. In St. Kitts, however, the
reaction against the Stamp Act was more violent. Stamped papers stored at a
merchant’s house were torched by a mob of some 300-400 people, and the stamp
distributor, William Tuckett, was forced to resign his post. The St. Kitts authorities apparently made no effort to enforce the Act, and the St. Christopher Gazette
was published unstamped throughout the period of operation of the Stamp Act
[Spindel, 1977].
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tary force should be used to secure compliance [Bullion, 1992].
Following the report of the parliamentary committee and subsequent debate, the decision was taken to repeal the Stamp Act. As
Bullion [1992] concludes, “[w]hen their expectations of American acquiescence proved incorrect, the majority of the cabinet
were too familiar with the difficulties of a military response and
too unimpressed with the Stamp Act to favor a confrontation.”
The committee noted that insurrection had taken place in
some of the North American colonies, and that the insurrection
had been encouraged by resolutions of the colonial assemblies
in the respective provinces. The committee resolved that these
matters be put before the King with a request that he direct the
governors of the colonies to find the principal trouble makers
and punish them. The King was also to be asked to instruct the
governors to recommend to the assemblies that recompense be
made to those who had suffered loss during the insurrection.
The committee resolved finally that “the Parliament of Great
Britain had, hath and of Right ought to have, full Power and
Authority to make Laws and Statutes of sufficient Force and
Validity, To bind the Colonies and Peoples of America – subjects
of the Crown of Great Britain in all cases whatsoever” [BM Add
Ms 33030 f.74].
The merchants in the House of Commons were naturally
foremost among the advocates of the repeal and, according to
Namier [1966, p. 254], only “six only out of some 52” voted for
repeal. On division, the resolution for the repeal of the Stamp
Act was approved by 275 votes to 167, and the resulting bill
repealing the Stamp Act was given royal assent on March 18,
1766.
The repeal of the Stamp Act by the Rockingham ministry
should not be read as acceptance of the American view. Indeed,
according to Thomas [1975, p. 33], the repeal came about because of “an unusual combination of circumstances, not through
widespread support for the colonial cause. In the general context
of British political attitudes towards America, it was a misleading fluke.” The repeal was accompanied by a declaratory act
which set out the right of Parliament to pass laws binding on
the American colonies [Plumb, 1963, p. 127; Beloff, 1965]. William Pitt had attacked the Stamp Act on the basis that England
had no right to impose internal taxes in America, and its repeal
has been attributed to his efforts [Dowell, 1888, p. 154]. In notes
for a Speech on the Declaratory Resolution, Burke said [Langford,
1981, p. 47]:
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The situation extended from between the Tropicks to
the pole in such an Extent in such Situations and under
such a variety of Circumstances, that it would be impossible to govern them all upon a plan of Government
settled even there. Taxation the nicest part of Domestic
polity, so that Had the Question been now before us to
form a new Plan of Polity for our Colonies, it would be
right totally to leave the affair of internal Taxation to
themselves.
In the breadth of the duties encompassing nearly all legal
transactions as well as newspapers and pamphlets, Grenville
had impinged on “each nerve centre in American life at which
either economic or intellectual activity was registered” [Pole,
1973, p. 42]. The anticipated revenue had been estimated at
between £60,000 and £100,000 per year but, according to Dowell
[1888], and as confirmed by the accounts in Figure 1, the actual
yield was £3,000 in 1767 and £1,000 in 1768 plus a bitter legacy
of resistance.
As noted by Preston [2006, p. 572] in the context of the Nav
ajo, action at a distance may be well intentioned, here bringing
the colonists into the imperial fiscal web, but may nonetheless
“become a brutal fact to those upon whom it is enacted,” revealing a fatal mismatch between “global and local logics.”
THE AFTERMATH
Following the repeal of the Stamp Act, it remained to deal
with the shipping back the unused stamped paper and parchment not destroyed in the disturbances. This process took some
time with Figure 5, an expanded version of Figure 3, demonstrating how it played out. In October 1766, the stamped paper
and parchment that had not been sent to America was ordered
to be “made usefull [sic] to Britain” by having the stamp cut
off so that it could be re-used [Koeppel, 1976, 15]. Figure 3 (repeated as the top half of Figure 5) is an extract from the account
of the warehouse keeper of stamped goods charged with receipt
of the returned paper from America. Following the repeal, this
officer was discharged from his obligations by the cancellation
of the stamps and removal of the paper into the hands of the
warehouse keeper of unstamped goods.
Figure 6 shows that the paper was sold back to the stationer
who had supplied it in the first instance to be re-used in Britain.
This process took some time, consignments being delivered over
the course of the period from 1767-1772.
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FIGURE 5
Warehouse Keeper of Stampt Goods
1765
£
s D
1765
£
s D
Oct 31st to Stampt
By
sundry
goods received
222,506 11 6½ Oct 31st
172,586 11 1¾
consignments
from the Teller
Commissioners
Sept 3rd order paid receiver
17
17 8
general for stamps
1766
Do for parchment
Oct 14th and paper
49,902 2 8¾
cancelled
222,506 11 6½

1766

Nov 29th

222,506 11 6½
Commissioners
orders to discharge
the returns same
23,924 12 6½
having been
cancelled
8½
Ditto
19,533 10

1767
June 16th
Sept 8th Ditto
1768
Ditto
April 12th
1769
Ditto
Sept 26th
Returns from the
105,138 8 9¼
several distributors

11,440 1 3¼
6¾
39,848 6
10,391 17

8¼

105,138 8 9¼

Source: N.A.: AO3/1086

Earlier, Figure 4 showed how the consignments of stamped
paper were allocated among various colonial distributors. The
remainder of this abstract, reproduced as Figure 7, shows
which colonies collected the tax, which returned the paper and
parchment, and which “mislaid” it during the disturbances. The
abstract shows cash received from the distributors in Quebec,
Montreal, West Florida, Jamaica, St. Kitts, Barbados, and Georgia.
Finally on this point, the accounts in Figure 1 show that
stamped paper to the value of approximately £155,000 was
cancelled. Without the underlying working papers, it is not immediately apparent what constitutes this total, given that to the
distributors’ abstract, returns totaled only £105,138. The difference may represent paper and parchment which had not yet
been dispatched to the colonies.
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Source: N.A.: AO3/1086
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FIGURE 7
Distributors’ Abstract (extract)
Districts

Cash
£
s
Connecticut
--- New Hants
--- Pensilvania
--- Quebec
316 10
Virginia
--- Montreal
273 3
Nova Scotia
--- New Jersey
--- Marylands
--- Grenada
--- West Florida
50
North Carolina
--- New York
--- Boston New England
--- Rhode Island
--- Bermudas
--- Bahama
--- Spanish Town Jamaica 2,097 2
South Carolina
--- Antigua
--- St Kitts
8
13
Barbadoes
500 Georgia
45
East Florida
--- 3,292 9

D
8
9
6
11

Returns
£
s D
6,793 8 4¼
1,657 7
7,950 10 9
4,437 4 2¾
4,948 6 7½
2,587 15 9
473 14 4¾
3,552 8 6½
4,948 6 7½
3,219 1 8½
2,797 15 4
4,966 11 7½
181 3 8,245 17 5¾
3,236 8 9
1,199 4 2¼
1,986 - 8¼
5,953 12 4½
11 3½
5,486 8
4,100 3 11
18 5
3,820 6 7¾
1,000 1 2½
8 9¼

Transfers
£
s D
--- - --- - --- - 84
2 8
--- - 1,039 5 --- - --- - --- - --- - --- - --- - --- - --- - --- - --- - --- - --- - --- - --- - --- - --- - --- - --- - 1,123 7 8

Balances
£
s D
1,909 10 11
2,488 17 7
3,902 4
2,097 5 3½
4,735 13 7
2,073 1 ¼
1,133 7 5½
1,859 19 4½
2,479 14 10
756 4 ½
138 1 4½
2,479 14 10
8
4,167 19 2½
3,823 1 7
786 16 6
--- - 7,730 7
--- - 2,275 10 ¼
3,711 7 6
579 14 6
285 15 5¾
1,985 15 6
12 5½

Source: N.A.: AO3/1086

OBSERVATIONS ON THE STAMP ACT ACCOUNTS
The final account is shown in Figure 1. Aspects of that account remain unresolved. We have been unable to ascertain
the nature of the two entries for “incidents,” £371.16s.11d. and
£335.1s.8d. respectively, but this possibly includes some element
of compensation paid to distributors and ship owners who lost
money during the disturbances. There were several petitions
to Parliament seeking such compensation, but whether these
would be reflected in the accounts is uncertain. One such petition related to damages of £55.10s. for additional expenses
incurred as a result of having to unload stamped paper upriver from the port as a result of danger from the disturbances
[T1/479 ff 223-224]. It certainly appears, furthermore, that the
accounts do not include a bill from the solicitor of the Stamp
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Office, Thomas Cruwys, for the drafting of the Stamp Bill.
As is clear from Figure 1, the accounts produced in 1772
are in charge-discharge form. This was the prevailing form for
government accounting during the 18th century, not only in
Britain but also in Continental Europe. It was not until the first
half of the 19th century that attempts were made to standardize
government accounts using double-entry bookkeeping [Edwards
and Greener, 2003]. Lemarchand [1994, pp. 193-194] examines
the transition to double-entry bookkeeping from charge and
discharge in France during the 18th century and notes that
mineral and metallurgy operations did not make the transition,
most probably because they were, in large part, financed by the
nobility and financiers for whom charge and discharge was a
more familiar system. The essence of charge and discharge is
stewardship accounting, based on the separation of ownership
of capital and management and couched in terms of responsibility, accountability, and control. “The initial framework [of
charge and discharge] was the control of those in charge of handling royal or seigniorial funds or in the running of the domain.
This was much more than a method of bookkeeping, it was a
way of rendering accounts.” Charge and discharge goes beyond
cash accounting; the accountant “takes charge of everything he
receives, either at the outset of his management or during it. He
is discharged for all expenditure made for the purposes of such
management and then must settle the balance.” The process was
geared to ensuring the integrity of the accountant through the
obligation to render a final account subject to auditing.
Lacombe-Saboly [1997, p. 271] examines the accounting
systems of three French hospitals in the 18th and 19th centuries
and finds that, in the pre-revolutionary period, the same model
was used as that of French bankers and public accountants (i.e.,
charge and discharge). Movements in funds were recorded in
monetary units, even where actually exchanged in kind. “The accounting organization seems to have been conceived for submitting accounts to the management committee and supervisors,
and not merely for the gathering of information.” LacombeSaboly concludes that the system in use satisfied the need for
information. It was not used to record debtors and creditors in
the way that private merchants accounts did, and it seems that
the recording of receipts and expenditure was sufficient for the
needs of the hospital management.
Similar features can be noted in the colonial Stamp Act accounts. In particular, for the final account (Figure 1), the charge
is for the value that the stamped paper was expected to realize
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol35/iss2/5

36

Oats and Sadler: Accounting for the Stamp Act crisis
Oats and Sadler, The Stamp Act Crisis

137

on sale, not the cost of its purchase and the stamping process.
The final account is also supported by subsidiary accounts showing the charge and discharge at other stages in the process.
Holmes [1979] examines government accounting in colonial Massachusetts and, as part of his analysis, considers the
Treasurer’s books of account from 1754. While underpinned by
double-entry subsidiary accounts kept in the Italian method,
the reports of the fiscal position of the colony to the legislature
adopted charge-and-discharge format. Holmes corresponded
with Yamey regarding his findings, who apparently tentatively
confirmed that such accounts were unlikely to have been used
anywhere in Europe by government departments at that time.
It seems unlikely, therefore, that the underlying accounts for the
Stamp Act would have been kept in double-entry form.
CONCLUSION
The attempt by Britain to levy a stamp duty on the American colonies is an extraordinary episode in fiscal history. Unlike
other instances of tax-related rebellion [see Burg, 2004, for a
comprehensive analysis], however, it concerned not domestic
impositions but a new tax levied across vast geographical distances. Careful planning, sympathy with local conditions, and an
attempt to enlist the support of the colonies in its execution may
have assisted a successful implementation of the Stamp Act, but
clearly these issues were not sufficiently understood by the British Parliament. The episode stands as an example of how a tax
instrument which is successful in one setting will not necessarily
have the same effectiveness when transposed into another. The
tax displayed characteristics of a sovereign power as evidenced
by the inspection regime by which it was enforced, and the potential penalty of death without benefit of clergy for those found
to be forging stamps. The tax also, however, displayed characteristics of a disciplinary power, requiring taxpayers to be complicit
in its collection.21 This holds true for the British version of the
tax and explains in part its success at a time when other forms
of taxation, specifically tax on incomes, were unthinkable. In the
case of the imperial version, the government failed to enroll local actors to the extent necessary to make the tax work in practice at a distance.
By examining the literature, we have shown that the signal
failure of the Stamp Act is due to a number of contributing fac21

These concepts of power are derived from Foucault [1979].
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tors. Some of these are discussed extensively in the existing literature of the Stamp Act crisis. For example, the British Parliament failed to appreciate that the relationship between Britain
and the colonists was perceived in an increasingly different way
by both parties. In the British view, the right to tax was disassociated with the right to parliamentary representation at the time
when only a small proportion of Englishmen themselves were
represented. Distinguishing as they did between internal and
external taxes, the American colonists were prepared to accept
duties whose main purpose was to regulate trade. They were
far less inclined to accept a stamp tax regarded as an interference with their internal affairs. As a result of the differences in
outlook, the British government underestimated the depth of
the feeling against imperial taxation in any form. Communication delays rendered the implementation of the tax problematic
and contributed further to the tensions in the colonies. Most
importantly, the timing of the attempt to tax the colonies was
misjudged. Had earlier proposals, made as early as 1720, been
implemented, the colonists may not have been so quick to reject
it, but, by 1765, a growing sense of independence meant that any
form of taxation, no matter how carefully chosen, was bound to
interfere with that trend.
In this paper, we posit an additional explanation for the
failure of the imperial Stamp Act, which relates to the capacity
of the chosen fiscal instrument to galvanize a violent resistance
movement. We argue that the logistics of implementing a highly
complex form of taxation across vast geographical distances
were completely underestimated by Parliament, demonstrating
the failure to enact action at a distance. Even with the full cooperation of the colonists, it would have been extremely difficult
to manage the efficient operation of the Act and to reap the
expected revenue. More careful consideration of the different
economic and social conditions in the colonies and how these
would impact the implementation of the tax may have led to a
different design.
A number of features of the Stamp Act operations contributed to its rejection by some of the colonies. While stopping
short of a counterfactual argument, we note a number of possibilities. Had the colonies been allowed to stamp their own paper
(i.e., paper made in the colonies), the need to ship large bales of
stamped papers across the Atlantic would have been avoided.
The colonists would not then have been faced with such visible
evidence of imperial interference and would have been deprived
of the opportunity to demonstrate disapproval in such an inhttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol35/iss2/5
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flammatory way. In addition, the costs of producing newspapers
and other publications would not have been increased to such
an extent. Another feature relates to the choice of objects to be
taxed. Had the tax not been imposed on newspapers, pamphlets,
and almanacs, the printers may not have incited resistance
through the publication of inflammatory tracts.
Furthermore, had the British government paid heed to the
way in which the colonies were taxing themselves, the overlay of
stamp duties on items such as licenses to practice law or a profession, already subject to faculty tax, could have been avoided.
Massachusetts, in particular, was heavily taxed at the time
through a variety of different instruments.
Through the examination of primary source documents,
this paper shows the way in which the British government bureaucracy drew up the accounts for the American stamp and
demonstrates that it was not designed to “calculate the loss.”
Rather the accounts are charge-and-discharge accounts which
reflect the stewardship obligations imposed on those responsible
for the collection of the tax, consistent with the residual feudal
mentality still extant in the mid-18th century.
Finally, the examination of the accounts drawn up by the
British government some six years after the abolition of the
stamp duty provides insight into the nature of government accounting in the mid-18th century while underscoring both the
unnecessarily complicated nature of administering the impost
and the depth of its failure.
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